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ABSTRACT
Providing encrypted communications among power grid components is expected to be a basic requirement of smart grid
systems in the future. Here, we propose a key management architecture and associated protocols tailored to support
encrypted smart grid communications. The architecture consists of two levels structured around the grid control system
hierarchy. At the top level, which consist of control centers and regional coordinators, a bottom-up key structure is adopted
using hash chaining and a logical key hierarchy. The lower level of the architecture consists of the regional coordinators
(i.e., substations and distribution systems) and remote ends (e.g., meters and pole-top sensors) and utilizes a top-down key
management approach built on an inverse element method. The proposed key management schema supports the hierarchi-
cal structure of the smart grid control mechanisms, and it takes the resource and electronic/physical security differences of
the control levels into account. We define a set of protocols utilizing the architecture to provide secure unicast, multicast,
and broadcast communications. Furthermore, we illustrate how the architecture is flexible enough to easily handle power
grid nodes joining and leaving the system at the different levels. Lastly, we compare the proposed schema with existing
ones and show that our architecture can achieve efficient key management to provide secure communications. Copyright
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid is envisioned as the next generation power
grid that provides advanced electricity generation, distri-
bution and management, utilizing the latest information
and communication technologies to enable real-time load
and control capabilities from the point of generation to
the end user consumption point [1–3]. Providing reliable
and secure communications among the grid components
is considered a basic property that must be provided for
the smart grid to function [2]. Appropriate security mech-
anisms such as encryption are essential to prevent inside
and/or outside adversaries from forcing catastrophic deci-
sions by modifying or forging collected data and control
commands. A major challenge in supporting widespread
encryption of smart grid communications is management
of the encryption keys. In this paper, we focus on key
management in order to provide secure smart grid commu-
nications. Here, we attempt to design a scalable security
 An earlier version [4] of this paper was presented at the Fourth
IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications,
Vancouver, Canada, 2013.
architecture tailored to the power grid, particularly the grid
control system and the unique aspects of the smart grid
(e.g., variation in computational capabilities of devices and
variety of communication patterns).
One of the biggest changes from the current power grid
to the smart grid is the evolution of the control system from
a centralized type of control to a hierarchical decentralized
type of control [5–7]. Traditionally, the state of the power
system is defined as the magnitude of the voltage and its
phase angle at every bus in the system, and this is given as
feedback to centralized controllers at the power companies
and independent system operators (ISOs). In contrast, in
the smart grid, high-precision measurement equipment and
sensors are to be widely deployed allowing real-time deter-
mination of the demand, power quality, and fault diagnosis.
In order to accommodate renewable distributed power gen-
eration sources and distributed energy storage options, the
power control and balance will be implemented in a dis-
tributed hierarchical fashion. In such a hierarchical control
system, the controllers at the top of the hierarchy take
state input from lower layers and compute parameters that
are passed to controllers at lower levels for their local
control actions.
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Figure 1. Grid control architecture.
Consider the high level hierarchical smart grid control
architecture adapted from [6,7], shown in Figure 1. The
components in the architecture can be categorized into
three groups: (i) control centers (CCs), (ii) regional coor-
dinators (RCs), and (iii) remote ends (REs). The control
centers include ISOs, distributed system operators (DSOs),
bulk power generation, and transmission systems. The RCs
include the various substations and distribution systems.
The REs consist of a variety of end devices, such as, smart
meters, pole-top sensors, local distributed storage, local
power generation, and supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) devices. Note, that the RE group includes
a number of intelligent electrical devices such as volt-
age regulators, protective relays, and recloser controllers
that contain low level microprocessors and have equipment
lifetimes measured in decades. In contrast to the REs, the
CCs and the regional centers usually have rich computa-
tional resources. Therefore, for communications between
CCs and RCs, resource consumption is not the main
issue. However, for communications with REs, resource
consumption should be a major concern, especially the
resource consumption of security mechanisms. In general,
the communications between the control elements are time
critical in nature implying the need for efficient algorithms
that minimize the delay and computational costs.
In addition to the variations in computational resources,
smart grid components will have large variations in their
security environment. In North America, grid operators
are expected to conform to the North American Electrical
Reliability Corporation’s Critical Infrastructure Protection
Cyber Security standards [8,9], which require a number
of protection measures in the bulk power generation and
distribution system. For example, North American Elec-
trical Reliability Corporation standards require electronic
security perimeters (e.g., firewalls) and physical security
controls around critical cyber assets (e.g., ISO control
center). The standards classify cyber assets into three cate-
gories with low, medium, and high impact, which map into
three levels of security controls. Hence, the CC level of the
grid control architecture can be expected to have a strong
security environment. Similarly, the RC level is expected to
have an electronic security perimeter and physical security
in place although at a somewhat weaker level than the CCs.
However, the REs will typically have weak or no physi-
cal security and little or no electronic security perimeter.
Thus, one can assume that REs maybe accessed by adver-
saries, and one must guard against stepping stone attacks
launched from compromised REs.
Two types of communication are envisioned among the
control architecture elements: vertical communication (e.g.
from the ISO to REs) and horizontal peer-to-peer type of
communication (e.g. among several substations under the
same DSO). Both types of communication may use broad-
cast communication mode (e.g., from a DSO to all REs
belonging to the DSO), multicast communication mode
(e.g., among several RCs), or unicast communication mode
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(e.g., from a ISO to a DSO). Therefore, the security archi-
tecture must be versatile enough to support the various
communication modes.
Note that power grid nodes (CC, RC, and RE) in the
control architecture may leave the architecture because of
failures, scheduled downtime (e.g., for upgrades/patches),
loss of customers, etc. Similarly, nodes may join the grid
for a variety of reasons, such as expansion and addition of
customers. Hence, the security architecture must be flexi-
ble enough to support management of the keys for nodes
joining the grid and nodes leaving the grid. One would
expect that nodes joining/leaving will happen infrequently
in the level of CCs and RCs with the primary driver being
scheduled downtime, failures, accidents, and acts of nature
(e.g., hurricane and ice storm), whereas at the RE level,
the components can be expected to come and go more
frequently because of power customer churn and both acci-
dental failures and natural hazards. Because the number
of grid components will change over time with devices
being added and removed, the security architecture should
support backward and forward secrecy. Backward secrecy
indicates that the future secret keys must inaccessible by
former entities. Forward secrecy implies that the previous
used secret keys must be inaccessible by new grid entities.
Here, we propose a novel smart grid key management
architecture that is structured in a multi-level fashion sim-
ilar to the power grid control architecture. Specifically,
there are two levels to the security architecture with the
top level consisting of the control centers and regional
coordinators, whereas the bottom level is composed of the
regional coordinators and remote end units. Two differ-
ent key management mechanisms are introduced for upper
level communications and lower level communications,
respectively. The two different key management mecha-
nisms are adopted because of the variations in the elec-
tronic/physical security environment and computational
resources of the devices in the two levels. At the top level,
our schema employs the Iolus framework [10] for struc-
tured key management. In the Iolus framework, the mem-
bership changes in a subgroup will not affect other sub-
group members; thus, it mitigates the impacts of changes
on the whole system. At the bottom level, the key manage-
ment is constructed using a inverse element approach. The
proposed key management schema is a versatile schema as
defined in [11], in that it supports secure broadcast, multi-
cast, and unicast communications. Further, the architecture
provides backward and forward secrecy. We develop pro-
tocols for our architecture to support both horizontal and
vertical communications in multicast, broadcast, and uni-
cast communication modes. A comparative analysis of
the proposed architecture with existing schemas [11,12],
shows that our approach requires less communication and
storage costs and it can support the hierarchical structure
of the smart grid control system while incorporating the
variations in resources among components.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses related work. The key management architecture
is presented in Section 3. The protocols to make use of
the architecture in communications is shown in Section 4.
Section 5 describes how the dynamics of nodes joining
and leaving the key management architecture are handled.
Section 6 gives the security analysis and comparison with
some existing key management schemas. Conclusions are
given in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
Here, we highlight the research literature that is rele-
vant to the development of our proposed security archi-
tecture, and a broader recent survey of cyber security
literature for Smart Grid systems is given in [2]. The
studies on determining trust models can be helpful for
securing communications among various devices. These
trust-based approaches can be classified into several cat-
egories, such as authentication management for public
keys [13], e-commerce [14], and peer-to-peer networks
[15]. This includes work on key management schemas for
secure communications. Because the key management of
multicast communications is more complex than unicast
communications [16], a key tree management structure
has been widely discussed for multicast communications.
Usually, these methods adopt a hierarchy of keys for mul-
ticast communications, in which each member is assigned
a set of keys based on its location in the key tree [17,18].
In wireless sensor networks, Ren et al. proposed an effi-
cient key generation schema, which could greatly reduce
the storage cost of pre-key distribution [19]. In [20], Ren
et al. proposed three different broadcast authentication
mechanisms in wireless sensor networks and quantitatively
analyze their energy consumption. However, they did not
discuss unicast authentication. Law et al. [21] proposed
WAKE, which is a key management schema for wide-
area measurement system in smart grid. This schema is
based on multiple-time signature schemas, which is dif-
ferent from our binary tree-based approach. The work of
Nicanfar et al. [22] is focused on the smart grid mutual
authentication and a smart grid key management protocol.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Multi-
cast Security Framework [23] consists of several elements
including a group controller and key server (GCKS),
group key management, and group security associations in
which the GCKS is a centralized host. To provide scal-
able multicast key management for heterogeneous wire-
less networks with high link error rates, Sun et al. [24]
proposed a method to manage multicast key trees that
match the network topology and thus reduced the com-
munication overhead of rekeying. In [25], Kong et al.
proposed a k-hop clustering-based approach to construct
a backbone of GCKS nodes, in which each GCKS is
also the leader of its cluster. It indicates that k-hop clus-
tering reduces the number of GCKS nodes and security
vulnerabilities. However, Kong et al.[25] do not depict
the algorithm about electing the cluster leader. Choi
et al. [12] proposed a key management schema for secure
group communications in SCADA systems. It uses the
Iolus framework to reduce the effects of group membership
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changes to the other groups, and it could also support
unicast communications and broadcast communications
in SCADA. However, it uses the same key management
mechanisms at the remote meters as that in the sub-master
terminal units, which ignores the limited resources issue
at the remote meters. Furthermore, by using the same key
structure throughout the system, it ignores the variations
in electronic and physical security of the devices. Kim and
Choi [11] proposed a more efficient schema than [12] for
secure communications in smart grid systems, which could
greatly reduce the resource consumption for key updates.
However, it does not adopt a hierarchical structure. The
recent work by Cao et.al. [26] discussed the need for a
layerd security architecture incorporating the variations
in computational capabilities and physical and electronic
security of devices in critical infrastructures such as the
power grid.
3. KEY MANAGEMENT
ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we first present motivation of the proposed
schema and then present our hierarchical key management
architecture.
3.1. Motivation
For providing secure communication for distributed smart
grid systems, security and efficiency are two of the most
Table I. Summary of notation.
Notation Definition/description
CCi The ith control center
RCi The ith regional center
REi The ith remote endpoint
hCC,RC Height of a tree between a CC and RCs
hRC,RE Height of a tree between a RC and REs
q Number of RCs
ri Number of REs under RCi
KDC Key distribution center
KCCi The key of CCi
Ki,j The jth key at level i in a binary tree
Kxi,j The jth key at level i in a binary tree in region x
Kbooti The bootstrap key of device i
EK() Encryption using key K
Edata Encrypted message/cipher text
DK() Decryption using key K
Signt Signature created at transmitter side
Signr Signature created at receiver side
SigIDi Signature ID of node i
H(), HL(), HR() Different hash functions
SID Session identity
KREGION The broadcast key in a region
Nodei,j The jth node at level i
Nodej The jth node in a non-hierarchical structure
Si,j Secret value of the jth node at level i
Sj Secret value of the jth node in a non-hierarchical structure
SETREi Set of secret values that REi possesses
Ksession Session key
HK () A keyed-hash function using K as the key
Kgs Group session key
Ng Set of multicast communication group nodes
Kbs The broadcast session key
GMK Set of group members that share the key K
AKK Set of ancestor keys of K, except for parent of K
CC, control center; RE, remote end; RC, regional coordinator.
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import aspects. That is, the proposed security architecture
should support backward and forward secrecy, as well as
consume as little resources as possible. In the current smart
grid systems, there are limited resources at remote meters
but such a condition is ignored in the current researches
(e.g., [12]). Thus, our proposed key management archi-
tecture aims to provide a more efficient key management
schema for the distributed system and at the same time
providing backward and forward secrecy.
3.2. Proposed key management schema
We list the definition/description of the symbols/notations
used in the paper in Table I. We show our key management
architecture in Figure 2. The architecture contains three
classes of components: CCs, RCs, and REs. The upper
level of the key structure (i.e. between the CC and RCs)
is constructed based on the Iolus framework [10] and logi-
cal key hierarchy (LKH) using a bottom-up approach [17].
In the upper level, the CC acts as a key distribution center
(KDC). The lower level of the key structure (i.e. between
RCs and REs) is constructed using a top-down approach
based on an inverse element structure. In the lower level,
RCs act as KDC for the attached REs. Note that an RC
contains two types of keys, one for the upper level and the
other for the lower level. Thus, the RC may contain two
sets of encryption and hash algorithms one for the upper
level and the other for the lower level.
3.2.1. Key structure in the upper level.
In the upper level, we utilize the Iolus framework,
which was proposed for secure multicasting based on a
secure distribution tree. The key structure in the upper level
employs a binary tree and LKH. A CC is the root node of
a binary tree, and RCs are leaf nodes of the binary tree.
The binary tree as shown in Figure 2 contains q leaf nodes.
Iolus uses a group security controller (GSC) to manage the
keys in a KDC fashion. Here, the CC acts as the GSC and
KDC. The height of the tree is hCC,RC = log2(q), if the tree
is complete, whereas the height of an incomplete tree is
hCC,RC = dlog2(q)e. Each RC leaf node will be assigned a
secret key when it joins the system, and for leaf node i, the
secret key is KhCC,RC,i The secret keys are assigned using
the bootstrap procedure discussed in Section V . A form of
hash chaining is used to determing the keys as one moves
up the tree. Specifically, a parent node secret key is con-
structed in a bottom-up fashion by hashing the secret keys
of its two children nodes, as defined in Equation (1):
KhCC,RC–1–j,(i+1)/2 = H

H(KhCC,RC–j, i), H(KhCC,RC–j,i+1)

(1)
where H is a hash function, i is an odd number, 1  i <
2hCC,RC–j, and 0  j < hCC,RC. If a node has only one
child, then it creates a virtual copy of itself as a child and
obtains a leaf node key for the virtual copy, which is then
used in Equation (1) with the single child key. Scalability
is provided by designating some nodes in the tree as group
security intermediaries (GSI), thereby breaking up the tree
into subgroups. The GSC manages the top-level subgroup
and GSIs. The GSC knows the keys of the GSIs, and a GSI
knows all the keys and group key of the nodes that belong
to the GSI.
3.2.2. Key structure in the lower level.
The lower level uses a different key structure from
the upper level. This is intentional to accommodate the
computational resource constraints and weaker physi-
cal/electronic security of REs. One difference from the key
structure in the upper level is that there is a region key
KREGIONm (i.e., group key) for all the REs under RCm. The
lower level employs a top-down inverse element approach
for the sub-binary tree that contains one RC and all REs
logically belonging to the RC. The RC acts as a KDC and
will assign the corresponding secret keys obtained through
the inverse element approach and the region key to all
other nodes in the sub-binary tree. Assume RCm has r
Figure 2. The proposed key management architecture. CC, control center; RE, remote end; RC, regional coordinator.
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Figure 3. Key structure in lower level using inverse elements.
REs. First RCm will be assigned a secret value S0,1 as its
secret key Km0,1. The secret values of its children nodes are
constructed based on its own secret value, using:
(
Si,j = HL(Si–1,(j+1)/2)
Si,j+1 = HR(Si–1,(j+1)/2)
(2)
where j is an odd number, HL() is the hash function for
the left child, and HR() denotes the hash function for the
right child. For a non-root node of the binary tree in the
lower level, the secret value is not its secret key. Before
presenting the secret key of non-root nodes, we first intro-
duce the concept of a restricted path for a non-root node.
The restricted path of a non-root node is the path from
itself to the root node in the binary tree. The secret key
of a non-root node is the set of all the secret values in
the tree except secret values along the restricted path.
For example, in Figure 3, the restricted path of Node3 is
Node3—Node1—Node0. Thus, the secret key of Node3 is
all other secret values in the tree except the secret values
of Node3, Node1, and Node0, which are the secret values
of Node4„ Node2, Node5 and Node6. Because the secret
values of Node5 and Node6 can be calculated based on the
secret value of Node2 using Equation (2), the secret key of
Node3 is as follows:
K3 = SET3 = {S3, S1, S0}
= {S4, S2, S5, S6}
= {S4, S2}
(3)
The last step is obtained because S5 = HL(S2) and S6 =
HR(S2). In this way, we can obtain secret keys of all the
nodes in the binary tree and the root-node RC knows all the
secret keys. Note that, every non-root node (i.e. RE) knows
its own key and the region key only.
4. KEYS AND PROTOCOLS FOR
VERSATILE COMMUNICATIONS
In this section, we present protocols illustrating how to
use the proposed key management schema in unicast, mul-
ticast, and broadcast communications. We do not specify
the encryption algorithms or hash functions to be used but
note that the computational differences between the levels
in the security architecture should be considered in their
selection. We assume that the communication network
interconnecting the power grid components meets recom-
mended US Department of Energy Quality of Service goals
[27], such that delay, packet loss, and availability are not
an issue. Further, we assume all devices (REs, RCs, and
CCs) are addressable with MAC and/or IP addresses.
We assume that an adversary has one or more of the fol-
lowing goals: (i) to inject a counterfeit a message, (ii) to
modify an existing message to one or more receivers, and
(iii) to passively collect information from messages. Fur-
thermore, we assume that the adversary has the following
capabilities: access to all communication links, the ability
to capture, resend or eavesdrop on some or all packets, and
much greater computation power than the normal network
components (i.e., RCs and REs).
In order to provide secure communications, we adopt
the use of one time session keys Ksession, which are used
to guarantee the freshness of the key and the confidential-
ity of the communication by encryption. A session identity
(SID) is used as an input to the session key generation. The
SID is a random number, which is used to guard against a
replay attack. Additionally, we adopt the use of signatures
Signt and Signr, which are the signatures of the messages
computed at the transmitter side and receiver side, respec-
tively. If the signatures are the same when compared at the
receiver, the integrity of the communication is guaranteed.
Also each node i has a signature ID SigIDi derived via a
hash function of the node’s network address.
4.1. Unicast communications
Unicast communications will be used in a number of
scenarios, and Table II summarizes the session keys for
unicast communications. We first demonstrate the process
of secure unicast communications between grid compo-
nents in the same layer of the security architecture, for
example, between a CC and a RC, or a RC and a RE under-
neath it. Figure 4 illustrates the communication process
that has the three steps given as follows.
Step 1 Ni generates session key Ksession
Edata = EKsession (Data)
Signt = HKsession (Edata)
Step 2 Ni ! Nj: (Edata k Signt k SID).
Step 3 Nj generates session key Ksession
Signr = HKsession (Edata)
IF Signr = Signt
data = DKsession (Edata)
END
Step 1 in the procedure involves determining the session
key, encrypting the data, and then determining the integrity
signature by hashing the encrypted data. For unicast com-
munication between a RC and a RE, the session key can
be obtained by hashing the secret set of the RE and the
SID. For unicast communications between two nodes in
the upper level, the session key is to hash the shared
key (Kshare) between two nodes through the logical key
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:3602–3617 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 3607
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Table II. Keys for unicast communications.
Unicast scenario Session key
A RC and a RE Ksession = H(SETRE k SID)
A RE and a RE under the same RC Ksession = H(˚(
T
SET{REs}) k SID)
A RC and a RC Ksession = H(Kshare k SigIDi k SigIDj k SID)
A CC and a RC Ksession = H(KRC k SigIDCC k SigIDRC k SID)
CC, control center; RE, remote end; RC, regional coordinator; SID, session identity.
Figure 4. Process of unicast communications in upper level or
in the same region in the lower level.
Figure 5. Process of unicast communications that depends on
the relay of regional coordinator (RC)(s).
hierarchy structure, together with the signature of the two
nodes and a SID. For example, the shared key between the
CC and a RC is KRC, and the session key generation is
shown in the fourth row of Table II.
If two REs under the same RC would like to communi-
cate with each other, the session key is obtained by hashing
the result of XORing the elements in the intersection (i.e.,
˚(T SET{REs})) of the two REs’ secret sets and a SID.
For example, the session key between Node3 and Node6
in Figure 3 is Ksession = H(S4 ˚ SNode5 k SID). This is
because K3 = {S2, S4, S5, S6} and K6 = {S1, S3, S4, S5},
so the intersection of K3 and K6 is {S4, S5}.
Note, that there are unicast communication cases that
depend on the relay of a RC or RCs, as shown in Figure 5.
Examples of such communication include unicast between
a CC and a RE and unicast between REs that are attached
to different RCs. The steps involved for communication are
as follows.
Step 1 Ni generates session key Ksession
Edata = EKsession (Data)
Signt = HKsession (Edata)
Encrypt session key: EKNi ,RC (Ksession)
Step 2 Ni ! RC: (Edata k Signt k EKNi ,RC (Ksession) k
SID).
Step 3 RC decrypts session key Ksession =
DKNi ,RC (EKNi ,RC (Ksession)) and encrypts it with
the key known to both RC and node Nj, that is,
EKRC,Nj (Ksession). If there are two RCs involved in
the communications, there will be another round
of the decryption and encryption procedure.
Step 4 RC ! Nj: (Edata k Signt k EKRC,Nj (Ksession) k
SID).
Step 5 Nj decrypts session key and data
Ksession = DKRC,Nj (EKRC,Nj (Ksession))
Signr = HKsession (Edata)
IF Signr = Signt
data = DKsession (Edata)
END
Here, in Step 1, the sender node Ni also encrypts the ses-
sion key using the key KNi,RC, which is known by the RC
and itself. If the sender node is a CC, then KNi,RC = KRC;
if the sender node is a RE, then KNi,RC = SETRE. At Step
2, the sender node sends the encrypted message, signature,
the encrypted session key, and SID to the RC. In Step 3, one
or more RCs will facilitate the communication between Ni
and Nj. Consider the case where there is only a single RC
acting as an intermediate node; the RC decrypts the session
key using the key known to the RC and the sender node
Ni and then encrypts the session key by the key known
only to the receiver node Ni and itself. In Step 4, the RC
sends the encrypted message, signature, the encrypted ses-
sion key, and SID to the receiver. In Step 5, the receiver
first decrypts the session key, then computes the signature,
and compares it with the received signature. If they are the
same, the receiver will decrypt the cipher text to obtain
the message.
4.2. Multicast communications
Multicast communications could happen between a node
Ni and a group of nodes Ng. For example, between a CC
and several RCs, a RC and several REs, as well as a CC and
multiple REs. A multicast group session key Kgs is utilized
in multicast communications and can be obtained by hash-
ing a shared key (Kshare) among the group of nodes and a
SID. As noted earlier, the upper level key structure is based
on the Iolus framework, which was developed specifically
for scalable secure multicast communications [10]. In the
framework, the GSC and GSI maintains access control lists
of multicast groups each with a common shared key Kshare
as discussed in [10]. In the lower level, when a RC multi-
casts a message to many REs in the same region, the group
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session key is obtained by hashing the result of XORing
the elements in the intersection (i.e., ˚(T SET{REs})) of
these REs’ secret sets and a SID. Table III summarizes the
session keys for multicast communications. The process
in upper level/lower level is shown in Figure 6 with the
corresponding steps given as follows.
Step 1 Ni computes group session key Kgs
Edata = EKgs (Data)
Signt = HKgs (Edata)
Step 2 Ni ! Nj: (Edata k Signt k SID), Nj2multicast
group Ng, which know Kgs.
Step 3 Nj computes session key Kgs
Signr = HKgs (Edata)
IF Signr = Signt
data = DKgs (Edata)
END
In Step 1, the sender computes the group session key Kgs,
then encrypts the data, and computes a message signature.
As shown in Step 2, the source multicasts the cipher text,
signature, and SID to all the group member nodes. Each
group member receives the message, computes the group
session key, verifies the signature, and then obtains the
plain text as shown in Step 3.
In a fashion analogous to unicast communications, there
are cases where multiple RCs are needed to relay the
communications. In particular, the case of multicast com-
munications from the CC to multiple REs depends on the
relay of the RC(s) that control the REs. Also, if a RE would
like to multicast a message to a group of REs under a dif-
ferent RC, two RCs act to help exchange the session key.
Table III. Keys for multicast communications.
Multicast scenario Session key
A CC/RC to many RCs Kgs = H(Kshare k SID)
A RC/RE to many REs Kgs = H(˚(TSET{REs}) k SID)
CC, control center; RE, remote end; RC, regional coordinator; SID,
session identity.
Figure 6. Process of multicast communications in upper or
lower level.
That is, the first RC, which the transmitter RE belongs to,
encrypts the session key with a key that the second RC (the
receiver group belongs too) knows; thus, the second RC
can decrypt the session key and encrypt it with the shared
key of the receiver group. Then, the receiver group of REs
can get the session key.
4.3. Broadcast communications
Broadcast communications can occur between a CC and all
RCs in the upper layer, between a RC and all REs under the
RC in the lower layer and accross the two layers between
a CC to all REs. Table IV lists the session key genera-
tion procedure for broadcast communications. The most
complicated case is broadcast communications between a
CC and all REs, which requires all the RCs to serve as
relays. Figure 7 shows the process for the CC to REs broad-
cast case. The steps corresponding to Figure 7 are listed
as follows.
Step 1 CC computes broadcast session key Kbs
Edata = EKbs (Data)
Signt = HKbs (Edata)
Encrypt session key: EKCC (Kbs)
Step 2 CC ! RCs: (Edata k Signt k EKCC (Kbs) k SID)
Step 3 RC decrypts the broadcast session key as it knows
KCC and encrypts the broadcast session key with
the region key: EKREGION (Kbs)
Step 4 RC ! REs: (Edata k Signt k EKREGION (Kbs) k
SID)
Step 5 RE decrypts broadcast session key
Kbs = DKREGION (EKREGION (Kbs))
Signr = HKbs (Edata)
IF Signr = Signt
data = DKbs (Edata)
END
Table IV. Keys for broadcast communications.
Broadcast Scenario Session Key
A CC to all RCs or to all REs Kbs = H(KCC k SID)
A RC to all REs Kbs = H(KREGION k SID)
CC, control center; RE, remote end; RC, regional coordinator; SID,
session identity.
Figure 7. Process of broadcast communications between a
control center (CC) and all remote ends (REs). RCs, regional
coordinators.
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The CC first computes a broadcast session key Kbs and
uses this key to encrypt data and generate the signature.
If the broadcast communications only happen between
a CC and all RCs or a RC and all REs under the
RC, the broadcast session keys are generated according
to Table IV. If the broadcast communications happen
between a CC and all REs, as shown Figure 7, the CC first
generates the broadcast session key Kbs, encrypts the data,
computes the signature, and encrypts the broadcast session
key with its own key KCC. Then the CC broadcasts the
cipher text, signature, encrypted broadcast session key, and
SID to all RCs. A RC decrypts the session key, re-encrypts
it with the corresponding region key, and then broadcasts
the previous cipher text, signature, the new encrypted ses-
sion, and SID to all REs under itself. At last, REs decrypt
the broadcast session key, verify the signature, and then
obtain the plain text.
5. HANDLING GRID DYNAMICS
As noted earlier, power grid nodes (CC, RC, and RE)
in the key management architecture may leave the archi-
tecture because of failures, scheduled downtime (e.g., for
upgrades/patches), loss of customers, etc. Similarly, nodes
may join the grid for a variety of reasons, such as expansion
and addition of customers. Hence, the architecture must
be flexible enough to support management of the keys for
nodes joining and leaving the grid. One would expect that
nodes joining/leaving will happen infrequently in the upper
level of CCs and RCs, whereas in the lower level, REs can
be expected to come and go more frequently.
5.1. Nodes joining
In order for nodes to join the system, a bootstrapping
procedure is needed to identify the joining device to the
appropriate KDC and invoke the joining protocol. We
assume that each device RCi or REi comes with a factory
printed bootstrap key Kbooti or one is installed by the oper-
ator (e.g., 192-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
key). At the time of installation, a technician enters the
device’s bootstrap key into the appropriate KDC; that is, if
the device is an RC, then the bootstrap key is added to the
KDC at the CC, whereas if the device is an RE, then the
bootstrap key is added to the KDC at its local RC. Once
connected to the network, the RCi or REi sends a Kbooti
encrypted join request to appropriate KDC to initiate the
join protocol as discussed for each level in turn later.
5.1.1. Join protocol for upper level.
If a new RCi node would like to join the system,
it should follow the bootstrap procedure to send a join
request to the KDC at the CC as follows.
Step 1 RCi sends join request to KDC
Kbootsessioni = H(Kbooti k SID)
Edata = EKbootsessioni
(Data)
Signt = HKbootsessioni
(Edata)
RCi ! KDC at CC: (SigIDRCi k Edata k Signt k
SID)
Step 2 KDC at CC decrypts join request
Kbootsessioni = H(Kbooti k SID)
Signr = HKbootsessioni
(Edata)
IF Signr = Signt
Data = DKbootsessioni
(Edata)
END
Upon receiving a join request, the CC must add the new
RCi node to the binary tree and adjust the keys in the tree as
necessary. At the upper level, the key structure works from
the leaf nodes up using a hashing of left and right children
Figure 8. Node joining phase in the upper level.
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keys, and a full binary tree is required (i.e., every non-leaf
node must have two children). In order to add a new node
in to the full binary tree, one needs to expand the tree by
taking a leaf node j creating a virtual copy of the node
to replace itself as a parent node, inserting itself (e.g., the
original leaf node) as the left child while adding the new
RCi node as the right child node. The joining node is given
a new key, while the secret key of the node that has been
moved to the child position is unchanged (i.e., the original
leaf node), but the keys of the parent and ancestor nodes
should be updated using Equation (1). In Figure 8, we give
an example of the process. Because the binary tree is full,
a virtual node Node03,8 is created to replace the previous
leaf node Node3,8. And the previous leaf node Node3,8 is
move down as the left child node Node4,15 of the virtual
node Node03,8. The new joining node is assigned position
Node4,16 as the right child node of Node03,8. Node4,16 is
assigned K4,16 by the KDC, while the left child Node4,15
retains the previous key, which is relabeled (i.e., K4,15 =
K3,8). Next, the keys of Node3,8, Node2,4, Node1,2, and
Node0,1 should be updated using Equation (1), as shown in
Figure 8.
After the key updates, the change of keys should be
propagated to other nodes. That is, a node whose key
changed encrypts its new key and the new keys of its ances-
tor nodes using its left child node’s key and then propagates
the encrypted message to its left sub-binary tree. For exam-
ple, Node2,4, Node1,2, and Node0,1 need to propagate the
changes to their left children. This can be accomplished by
a targeted multicast from the nodes in question. Finally, the
KDC will encrypt all the keys of the nodes on the restricted
path of the new joining node and send this information to
the joining node. Hence, the join protocol after Steps 1 and
2 earlier is as follows:
Step 3 KDC at CC indicates to Nodeh,m to create a vir-
tual node Node0h,m for itself and move itself to
the position of the left child Nodeh+1,2m–1 without
changing its key Kh+1,2m–1 = Kh,m.
Step 4 KDC at CC generates and distributes a new key
Kh+1,2m for the joining RCi node, which will be
inserted to the key structure as Nodeh+1,2m
Kbootsessioni = H(Kbooti k SID)
Edata = EKbootsessioni
(Kh+1, 2m)
Signt = HKbooti
(Edata)
KDC at CC ! RCi (SigIDCCi k Edata k Signt k
SID)
Step 5 RCi obtains its secret key
Kbootsessioni = H(Kbooti k SID)
Signr = HKbootsessioni
(Edata)
IF Signr = Signt
Kh+1,2m = DKbootsessioni
(Edata)
END
Step 6 The parent and ancestor keys Ki,j(0 
i  h, j = d m2h–i e) are updated as
K0i,j = H(H(Ki+1,2j–1), H(Ki+1,2j))) at the nodes
along the restricted path and in the KDC.
Step 7 The ancestor nodes with updated keys propa-
gate the updated keys as needed using multicast
communications.
Step 8 KDC at CC sends the keys K0i,j(0  i  h, j =
d m2h–i e) to the new joining RCi using unicast com-
munications.
5.1.2. Join protocol for lower level.
At the lower level, each RCi acts as a KDC for the
REs attached to it. Consider a new REj sending a join
message to RCq to which it is attached following a boot-
strap procedure similar to the upper level. The steps are
as follows.
Step 1 REj sends join request to KDC at RCq
Kbootsessionj = H(Kbootj k SID)
Edata = EKbootsessionj
(Data)
Signt = HKbootsessionj
(Edata)
REj ! KDC at RCq: (SigIDREj k Edata k Signt k
SID)
Step 2 KDC at RCq decrypts join request
Kbootsessionj = H(Kbootj k SID)
Signr = HKbootsessionj
(Edata)
IF Signr = Signt
Data = DKbootsessionj
(Edata)
END
After processing the join request, RCq decides the posi-
tion (l, k) where the new node will be inserted into the
binary tree structure (usually a leaf node position). If the
binary tree is perfect before the new REj joins the tree, the
RC will expand the the binary tree to another layer by mov-
ing the leave nodes as the left children nodes at the new
level, then inserting the new REj as a right child node at a
new level in the tree. The key structure will be updated for
the remaining REs based on the following protocol:
Step 3 RCq broadcasts a join message EKREGION(JOIN, ENTITYindex, (l, k)) in the region.
Step 4 If the new node has a sibling in the expanded tree,
the sibling will obtain Sl,k from the RC.
Step 5 All nodes update the new structure of the
binary tree and locally update the region key by
K0REGION = H(KREGION ˚Sl,k) where ˚ stands for
the XOR function.
Step 6 RCq uses a bootstrap-based session key to send the
joining REj node K0REGION, SETl,k and its position(l, k) in the tree.
We use an example to show this process. As shown in
Figure 9, a new node would like to join the system, and
after the bootstrap based joins request (Steps 1 and 2), the
RCq decides to assign it to Nodeq3,8 in the key structure.
Next the following steps are executed.
Step 3 RC broadcasts EKREGION (JOIN, ENTITY8, (3, 8)).
Step 4 Nodeq3,7 will obtain S3,8 from the RC.
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:3602–3617 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 3611
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Smart grid key management X. Long, D. Tipper and Y. Qian
Figure 9. Node joining phase in the lower level.
Step 5 All nodes update the region key by K0REGION =
H(KREGION ˚ S3,8) and S3,8 = HR(S2,4).
Step 6 RC uses a bootstrap-based session key to send
K3,8 = {S3,7, S2,3, S1,1}, K0REGION and its position
in the key structure to the joining REj (Nodeq3,8).
5.2. Nodes leaving
Similar to nodes joining the system, the keys must be man-
aged when a node departs the system. A node departure
can be invoked either by a KDC at the appropriate level in
the hierarchy or by the node itself. Once the leave message
is authenticated and acknowledged, the KDC must remove
the departing node from the bootstrap database and the key
tree structure, and then the tree must be rearranged and
updated. We consider a more detailed description for each
level in turn.
5.2.1. Leave protocol for upper level.
When a RCi node leaves the system, the KDC will
remove it from the binary tree, and its sibling node will be
moved up to the position of the parent node. Once the tree
is rearranged, the keys along the restricted path are updated
using Equation (1), and the information is propagated as
needed. The leaving protocol is disscussed as follows.
Step 1 The KDC at the CC or the RCi uses the uni-
cast communication protocol to issue the Leave
command.
Step 2 The recipient of the Leave command (KDC at CC
or RCi) sends an acknowledgement using the uni-
cast communication protocol, and the KDC at the
CC receives the KDC key information for the lower
level nodes attached to RCi.
Step 3 The KDC examines the position of Nodeh,m, that
is leaving, deletes it from the key structure. The
sibling node Nodeh,m–1 (or Nodeh,m+1, which
depends on the tree structure) will be reassigned to
the position of its parent node Nodeh–1,dm/2e. Note,
the secret key of the sibling node is unchanged,
except the index of the key in the binary tree,
that is, K0h–1,dm/2e = Kh,m–1.
Step 4 The KDC in the CC updates all Ki,j(0  i 
h – 2, j = d m2h–i e) with K0i,j = H(H(Ki+1,2j–1), H(i +
1, 2j)).
Step 5 Let (0  i  h – 2, j = d m2h–i e, if 2  j = d
m
2h–i–1 e,
and then l = 2j – 1, else l = 2j. Because RCs
in-group GMKi+1,l will not know each sibling key
of the ancestor keys, they cannot update keys in
AKKi+1,l , instead they will obtain the keys from
the KDC. The KDC encrypts the new keys with
Ki+1,l and then sends the encrypted message to RCs
in GMKi+1,l using the multicast communication
protocol.
Step 6 Nodeh–1,dm/2e obtains all of the updated keys
K0i,j(0  i  h – 2, j = d m2h–i e) from the KDC.
Figure 10 shows an example of the process. In the
figure, Node3,8 is leaving the system. After an exchange
of the Leave command and its acknowledgement (Steps 1
and 2 earlier) between the KDC at the CC and Node3,8, the
procedure is as follows:
Step 3 The KDC as the CC removes Node3,8 from the
key structure. Then, its sibling node, Node3,7, is
reassigned to Node2,4, with key K02,4 = K3,7.
Step 4 The KDC updates Node1,2 and Node0,1’s keys
by K01,2 = H(H(K2,3), H(K02,4)) and K00,1 =
H(H(K1,1), H(K01,2)).
Step 5 The KDC encrypts the new key K00,1 of the
CC with K1,1 and sends the encrypted message
EK1,1 (K00,1) to those RCs under GMK1,1 , which
are on the CC’s left sub-binary tree. Because
these RC nodes know K1,1, they can decrypt the
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Figure 10. Node leaving phase in the upper level.
Figure 11. Node leaving phase in the lower level.
message and determine the new key of the root
node. Similarly, the KDC encrypts the new keys
K00,1 and K01,2 with K2,3 and sends the encrypted
message EK2,3 (K00,1, K01,2) to those RCs under
GMK2,3 . Because these RC nodes know K2,3, they
can decrypt the new keys.
Step 6 The KDC computes EK02,4 (K
0
0,1, K
0
1,2) and sends it
to Node2,4.
5.2.2. Lower level.
At the lower level, the leaving RE notifies the RC that
it would like to leave the system. The key structure will be
updated based on the following leave protocol:
(1) The RC broadcasts a leave message EKREGION(LEAVE, ENTITYindex) to all REs in the region.
(2) All nodes update the new structure of the binary tree
and locally update the region key by K0REGION =
H(KREGION ˚ SLEAVE).
As shown in Figure 11, the leaving node (Nodeq3,8) first
notifies the RC that it is leaving. Then,
(1) RC broadcasts the message EKREGION (LEAVE,
ENTITY8) in the region.
(2) All nodes update the new structure of the binary tree
and locally update the region key by K0REGION =
H(KREGION ˚ S3,8).
5.3. Forward and backward secrecy
As noted in the introduction, the security management
architecture should support backward and forward secrecy.
Backward secrecy indicates that the future secret keys must
inaccessible by former entities. In the upper level, after a
node leaves, all the keys on the restricted path from the
leaving node are updated; thus, the leaving node cannot do
better than a brute force method to compute the new keys.
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In the lower level, because the leaving node does not know
its restricted secret value, it cannot do better than a brute
force method to compute the new keys. Forward secrecy
implies that the previous used secret keys must be inacces-
sible by the new entities. In the upper level, after a new
node joins the system, the keys on its restricted path are
updated through a one-way hash function, so the new node
cannot compute the previous keys. In the lower level, the
joining node does not know its restricted secret value, and
the region key is updated by hashing the XOR result of
the current key with the restricted secret value of the join-
ing node. So the new node cannot determine the previous
region key.
6. COMPARISON AND SECURITY
ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our proposed key management
schema with the current centralized approach based on the
LKH proposed in [12] and the inverse element method
proposed in [11]. Both the approaches and our proposed
schema support versatile communications, that is, unicast,
multicast, and broadcast communications. We compare
them based on three categories, which are security and
resource utilization, communication costs, and number of
keys to store.
6.1. Security and resource utilization
comparison
Table V summarizes our comparison based on security
and resource utilization of the three schemas. Our pro-
posed schema and Choi et al. [12] support a hierarchical
structure; however, Kim and Choi [11] do not support
it. Our proposed architecture considers the resource dif-
ferences (i.e., variation in computational resources and
physical/electronic security) of entities in the system by
splitting the key management into two levels, but both [11]
and [12] ignore such differences. All three of the schemas
considered use a session key that is generated based on
hashing at least a key and a SID. Because the hash func-
tion is cryptographically secure and the SID is independent
from previous ones, the session key is updated for each
new session. Also, all three schemas compared provide for-
ward and backward security to nodes that join and leave
the structure.
Table V. Security and resource comparison.
[11] [12] Our schema
Hierarchical structure No Yes Yes
Resource differences No No Yes
Key freshness Yes Yes Yes
Forward secrecy Yes Yes Yes
Backward secrecy Yes Yes Yes
6.2. Communication costs comparison
In Table VI, we compare the communication cost of the
schema proposed here with the key management schemas
in [11] and [12]. At the upper level, our schema and Choi
et al. [12] both use the Iolus framework. Thus, they have
comparable overhead for node joining and leaving, which
is a function of the number of RC leaves q. The schema
of [11] has a flat structure, so it is not comparable. At the
lower level, for the node leaving phase of our proposed
schema, the RC only sends a broadcast message to all the
nodes after receiving the leaving message from the leav-
ing node; thus, the communication cost is O(1), which is
the same as that in [11]. However, in [12], the RC sends
dlog2 re updated keys to the other nodes in the system so
the communication cost is O(log2 r), where r is the num-
ber of REs assigned to a RC. Regarding the node joining
phase in the lower level, the RC in the proposed schema
sends dlog2 re secret values to the new joining node, so the
communication costs between the RC and the new join-
ing node are O(log2 r). Because the RC only sends one
message with the location of the new joining node and the
secret value of the new joining node to all the other nodes,
the communication cost of the other nodes is O(1). How-
ever, the operator in [12] needs to send dlog2 re updated
keys to the nodes in the systems, so the communication
costs is O(log2 r). In other words, although the communi-
cation cost of node leaving phase on the upper level of the
proposed schema is the same as that in [12], the commu-
nication costs in the lower level of the proposed schema
are greatly reduced, and thereby, the total communication
costs are less than [12].
6.3. Storage comparison
Table VII summarized the number of keys stored in the
entities at three different schemas. Because the schema in
[11] does not support the hierarchical structure and there
are only two classes of nodes in this schema, so, it is hard
to compare it with the proposed schema, and we mainly
compare with the schema in [12]. In the table, q denotes
the number of RCs in the system, and r denotes the num-
ber of REs attached to a RC. Regarding to the number of
keys stored in a CC or a RE, there is no difference between
our proposed schema and the schema in [12]. However,
Figure 12 shows the comparison of the number of keys
stored in a RC according to the number of RCs and the
number of REs under this RC between the two schemas.
We can see that in the proposed schema, a RC stores fewer
keys than that in [12].
As an illustration in a large power grid, we consider the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP)
system. The LADWP [28] is the largest public owned
power company in the USA operating a system consist-
ing of one energy control center and 196 substations
and serving 1 461 344 customers. The LADWP grid has
over 14 000 miles of transmission and distribution power
lines, and plans are in place to deploy smart meters to
3614 Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:3602–3617 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
X. Long, D. Tipper and Y. Qian Smart grid key management
Table VI. Communication cost comparison of key management schemas.
[11] [12] Our schema
Cost of CC
N/A
O(log2(q)) O(log2(q))
Leaving Leaving node O(1) O(1)
in upper level Others O(log2(q)) O(log2(q))
Cost of CC
N/A O(log2(q)) O(log2(q))Joining Joining node
in upper level Others
Cost of RC
O(1)
O(log2(r))
O(1)Leaving Leaving node O(1)
in lower level Others O(log2(r))
Cost of RC
O(log2(r)) O(log2(r))
O(log2(r))
Joining Joining node
in lower level Others O(1) O(1)
CC, control center; RE, remote end; RC, regional coordinator.
Table VII. Number of keys to store comparison.
[11] [12] Our schema
Num of keys
to store
A CC N/A q q
A RC 2 1+r+log2(q) 2 + log2(q)
A RE 1 + log2(r) 1 + log2(r) 1 + log2(r)
CC, control center; RE, remote end; RC, regional coordinator.
Figure 12. Number of stored keys in a regional coordinator (RC)
versus number of remote ends (REs) under RC and number of
neighbor RCs.
customers along with 10 000 micro-remote terminal units
(micro-RTUs) for monitoring power quality and fault diag-
nosis. Assuming 1 meter per customer and that the cus-
tomers are equally distributed among the 196 RCs, then
there are 1 471 344 REs (including the micro-RTUs) result-
ing in 7507 REs per RC. According to Table VII at the
lower level, in our schema, each RC only needs to store
only 10 keys. However, each RC needs to store 7518 keys
if using the schema in [12].
In a summary, on the aspect of security, our proposed
schema could achieve the same lever of security guaran-
tee as the other two approaches—providing both forward
secrecy and backward secrecy. Our proposed schema and
the schema proposed in [12] support the hierarchical struc-
ture for the smart grid systems, but the schema proposed
in [11] is not able to supports that structure. On the aspect
of the communication costs and storage requirement, our
proposed schema is more efficient in communication and
utilizes less storage compared with the schema proposed
in [12].
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a key management architec-
ture to enable secure encrypted data communications in
smart grid systems. The architecture is multi-level in struc-
ture, which provides several advantages, namely, ease
in allowing for differences in computational resources
among grid components, ability to tolerate the differ-
ences in electronic/physical security between core and
edge grid devices, and flexibility in adapting to compo-
nents joining and leaving the power grid. Also, the key
management architecture is arranged to fit the hierarchi-
cal control structure of the smart grid. The architecture
provides for versatile secure communications, supporting
encrypted unicast, multicast, and broadcast communica-
tions with low communication overhead. Furthermore, the
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architecture provides forward and backward secrecy in the
event nodes join or leave the grid. Comparing the pro-
posed schema with existing ones, the proposed schema
requires less communication overhead and storage costs,
and it supports the hierarchical structure of the smart grid
control system.
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